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ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
With respect to respondent Jon Dunn, the only issue on
appeal is whether or not the trial court erred in denying plaintiff's motion to join third-party defendant Jon Dunn as a party
defendant in a new cause of action after the applicable statute
of limitations had run.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action for declaratory judgment and, by proposed
amendment, for damages sustained to uninsured personal property
resulting from a fire-bombing incident.

The plaintiff Tony Vina

brought a declaratory judgment action against Jefferson Insurance
Company of New York (hereinafter JEFFERSON) and its local general
agent, Transwestern General Agency (hereinafter TRANSWESTERN),
praying for a declaration that the premises in question were covered by property damage insurance at the time of the loss and
that the defendants had an obligation to adjust and pay the loss.
JEFFERSON filed a cross-claim against TRANSWESTERN and a thirdparty action against the writing agent, Jon Dunn (hereinafter
DUNN).
Shortly before trial, plaintiff moved to file an amended
complaint which would join DUNN as a party defendant and add a
"THIRD CLAIM" for money damages against DUNN.

JEFFERSON, TRANS-

WESTERN and DUNN stipulated that the complaint could be deemed
amended to include a claim for actual damages as to JEFFERSON
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and TRANSWESTERN, provided the damages issue was bifurcated for
trial since there had been no discovery on that issue.

DUNN re-

sisted plaintiff's motion to join him as a party defendant.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to The Honorable Scott Daniels, sitting
without a jury.

Plaintiff's motion to join DUNN as a party defen-

dant was argued at the commencement of trial, taken under advisement and later denied.

At the conclusion of the case, the court

entered judgment in favor of defendants JEFFERSON and TRANSWESTERN
and, consequently, dismissed JEFFERSON'S cross-claim against TRANSWESTERN and its third-party complaint against DUNN.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Third-party defendant DUNN acknowledges that the factual
statement of plaintiff is essentially correct.

The facts per-

taining to plaintiff's Point III, which is the only point directed
against this third-party defendant, are as follows:
1.

The request for cancellation of the policy in question

was submitted to TRANSWESTERN by DUNN on or about November 15,
1979 (Ex. 4-P) and TRANSWESTERN on behalf of JEFFERSON cancelled
the policy effective November 28, 1979
2.

(Complaint, 17, R.3).

The property in question was destroyed by fire on De-

cember 31, 1979 (Complaint, 1f9, R.3).
3.

JEFFERSON denied coverage for the loss in question

and plaintiff filed a complaint with the Utah Insurance Commission
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which on September 30, 1980 conducted a hearing in which DUNN
testified regarding his activities in procuring and cancelling
the policy in question (R.391).
4.

Plaintiff initiated this action by the filing of a

complaint on February 19, 1982 which prayed only for declaratory
relief and named only JEFFERSON and TRANSWESTERN as defendants
(R.2-5).

In conjunction with its answer, JEFFERSON filed a third-

party complaint against DUNN alleging that DUNN "was an independent agent with agency authority through Transwestern General
Agency" and that he "took the initial application for insurance
from the plaintiff and was also responsible for the cancellation
of said policy."
5.

(R.18).

On June 24, 1985, the court entered a scheduling order

providing that motions to amend pleadings "shall be heard by August 30, 1985.

After this date such motions shall be heard only

upon a showing of extremely exceptional circumstances."
6.

(R.36).

Plaintiff's motion to amend his complaint to add DUNN

as a defendant was not filed until September 3, 1985 (R.44) and
was not heard until the commencement of trial on October 1, 1985
(R.153-185).
7.

Plaintiff's proposed amended complaint (R.52-59) added

a THIRD CLAIM against DUNN personally, alleging, inter alia, that
DUNN:
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(a)

was at all times referred to herein an agent

for Defendants Transwestern General Agency and Jefferson
Insurance Company, (14), [and that he]
(b)

breached a duty he had to the plaintiff to prop-

erly complete the application of insurance listing the
defendant as a co-insured on the policy or an insured with
an insurable interest in said policy to receive notification of any and all changes and/or cancellation of the
insurance policy.

The defendant, John Dunn, negligently

listed the plaintiff, Tony Vina, as a partner with the
co-insured, Beverly Pencille, instead of properly listing
him as an additional insured, even though he had prior
knowledge of the relationship between the co-insureds and
that the insurance was written on the personal property
at the plaintiff's place of business (119).
The prayer of the amended complaint in addition to praying for
declaratory relief against all defendants, prayed

!f

[f]or judgment

against the defendant, Jon Dunn, for any and all losses sustained
by the plaintiff as a result of the fire on the premises, including damage to his personal property and loss of earnings thereon.ff
(15, R.58).
8.

The court took plaintiff's motion to amend his com-

plaint to join DUNN as a party defendant under advisement (R.184
& 185) and on October 2, 1985 at the end of the morning session,
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the court denied plaintiff's motion to join DUNN as a party defendant on the grounds (1) that the cause of action alleged against
DUNN in the amended complaint was different from that alleged
against him in the third-party complaint and (2) that the motion
was untimely (R.470).
9.

At the conclusion of the evidence, defendant JEFFERSON

moved for an involuntary dismissal of the action pursuant to Rule
41b, U.R.C.P., (R.491) which was joined in by defendant TRANSWESTERN (R.498).

The court granted the motions (R.516), holding,

• . . I think there was a partnership
by estoppel based primarily on the representations made by Mr. Dunn to the insurance agency and to the insurance company
wherein he represented on the questionnaire form and on subsequent communications that they were a partnership.
In addition to those representations
made by Mr. Dunn, there are some facts
done by the insureds themselves, specifically when Ms. Pencille reduced the coverage on the policy with Mr. Vina's approval, and that was done solely by her signature. I think that was a representation
of the company, and that she had authority
to deal in insurance matters for both
the insureds.
Also the address on the policy which
was received both by Ms. Pencille and
Mr. Vina indicated that, that it was Beverly Pencille and Tony Vina doing business
as this tavern, and that's an indication,
I think, that they are both in that tavern
business, and that any notice would just
go to the tavern. And I think that is
a sort of representation, too, that they
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allowed that to come. They didn't say
anything about it and dealt in that fashion. I think that's a representation
to Jefferson and to the agent that would
support a finding of partnership [by]
estoppel. (R.518-518).
10.

The trial court's holdings were then reduced to a

formal JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE entered on December
4, 1985 dismissing with prejudice plaintiff's causes of action
against JEFFERSON and TRANSWESTERN and, consequently, JEFFERSON's
cross-claim against TRANSWESTERN and its third-party complaint
against DUNN.

(R.136-137).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The trial court properly denied plaintiff's motion to add
DUNN as a party defendant because the claim sought to be asserted
against him was (1) barred by the applicable statute of limitation, (2) a substantially different cause of action than that
alleged against him in the third-party complaint, (3) being asserted by the plaintiff who had no identity of interest with the
third-party plaintiff who originally sued him and he had no identity of interest with the defendants originally sued by the plaintiff, but was in fact on the opposite side of the insurance transaction in question and (4) urged by a motion not timely filed
or heard as required by the trial court's scheduling order.
POINT I.
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM AGAINST JON DUNN IS
TIME-BARRED.
The fire in question occurred on December 31, 1979, as
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noted at paragraph 10 of the Amended Complaint (R.54-55).

Plain-

tiff's motion to file the amended complaint which purported to
join DUNN as a party defendant was filed September 3, 1985 (R.44),
almost six years after the loss.

The Third Claim directed to

DUNN personally alleges damages to personal property and prays
to recover the amount of such damages and the loss of income which
would have been derived therefrom (R.57).
Section 78-12-26(2), U.C.A., 1953, as amended, requires
that

f,

[a]n action for taking, detaining or injuring personal prop-

erty, . . ." be commenced within three years.

There is no allega-

tion or contention that the statute was tolled by any conduct
of DUNN.

To the contrary, DUNN was always within the state of

Utah following the loss in question and testified regarding his
involvement in the writing and cancelling of the policy in question before the Insurance Commissioner on September 23, 1980,
less than one year after the loss and more than two years before
the statute of limitations expired.

Clearly, plaintiff's claim

against DUNN is time-barred unless the "relating back" provisions
of Rule 15(c), U.R.C.P., apply.

DUNN contends that they do not,

as discussed hereafter.
POINT II.
THE "RELATION BACK" PROVISIONS OF RULE
15(c) ARE NOT APPLICABLE TO THE FACTS
OF THIS CASE.
Rule 15(c), U.R.C.P., states that:

-7-

Whenever the claim or defense asserted
in the amended pleadings arose out of
the conduct, transaction, or occurrence
set forth or attempted to be set forth
in the original pleading, the amendment
relates back to the date of the original
pleading.
As worded, the rule permits only amendments to the claims or defenses of parties to the original pleadings and does not permit
the substitution or addition of parties.

In Doxey-Layton Co.

v. Clark, 548 P.2d 902 (1976), this Court stated the general rule
as follows:
Generally Rule 15(c), U.R.C.P., will not
apply to an amendment which substitutes
or adds new parties for those brought
before the court by the original pleadings-whether plaintiff or defendant.
This for the reason that such would amount
to the assertion of a new cause of action,
and if such were allowed to relate back
to the filing of the complaint, the purpose of the statute of limitation would
be defeated.
Id. at 906.

However, the court noted that there is an exception

to this rule:
The exception operates where there is
a relation back, as to both plaintiff
and defendant, when new and old parties
have an identity of interest; so it can
be assumed or proved the relation back
is not prejudicial. . . .
This necessary identity of interest was most recently explained in Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co., et al, 681 P.2d
214 (Utah 1984), where Perry, the subcontractor sued by the general contractor for installing defective doors, brought a third
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party action against Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co., the supplier,
and Payne Lumber, the manufacturer of the doors.

The supplier

and manufacturer moved for summary judgment on the third-party
complaint on the basis that it was barred by the four-year statute
of limitations set forth in S70A-2-725, U.C.A., 1953, as amended.
The trial court granted the motion and this Court affirmed, citing
with approval the aforementioned rule from Doxey-Layton, supra,
and noting that:
'Identity of interest1 as used in this
context means that the parties are so
closely related in their business operations that notice of the action against
one serves to provide notice of the action
to the other. Such an identity exists,
for example, between past and present
forms of the same enterprise. See, Spiker
v. Hoogeboom, Colo. App., 628 PTTcT 17/7
179 (1981). In this case, there was no
evidence showing any identity of interest
between the original plaintiff, the defendant, and the third-party defendants other
than privity of contract. This is an
insufficient identity of interest for
the purpose of Rule 15(c). If any thirdparty action automatically related back
to the date of filing of the original
complaint, Rule 15(c) would become an
all-encompassing rule that would eliminate
all limitations on third-party actions.
The law is otherwise.
As in Perry, _a fortiori, in the instant case there is no
identity of interest between the original defendants JEFFERSON
• and TRANSWESTERN and third-party defendant DUNN.

In fact, their

interests and responsibilities were diametrically opposed in the
transactions that gave rise to this lawsuit.
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TRANSWESTERN was

JEFFERSON'S general agent and responsible for determining that
JEFFERSON'S underwriting requirements were met in issuing the
policy in question, whereas DUNN, by statute,—

was the agent

of VINA and responsible for determining that his needs were met
in securing the policy in question.

As the trial court noted:

. . . I find that Dunn was the agent in
this case of Mr. Vina and Ms. Pencille.
That not only under the Insurance Code,
but under the ordinary principles of principal and agent law, he was acting in
their behalf in procuring the insurance.
(R. 517).
Because DUNN's duty was to VINA and not to JEFFERSON, the
third-party complaint of JEFFERSON against DUNN under the initial
complaint which prayed only for declaratory relief was rather
innocuous, whereas the amended complaint which focused on DUNN's
duty to VINA as his agent and prays for monetary relief against
him in the Third Claim is an entirely different claim and would
subject DUNN to a potentially much greater liability exposure.
Plaintiff's counsel acknowledged that the claim he was asserting
in the Amended Complaint is "quite a different cause of action
than is asserted in the Third-party Complaint."

(R.163).

To

permit such amendment would effectively negate the applicable
2/
statute of limitation— contrary to the guidelines set down in
Perry to govern such situations.

Therefore, the trial court's

1.

§§31-17-2 and 31-17-33, U.C.A. (1953).

2.

§78-12-26(2), U.C.A. (1953).
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denial of plaintiff's motion to amend to add DUNN as a party defendant should be affirmed.
POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
TO AMEND FOR BEING UNTIMELY.
Even if the proposed amendment to the complaint to add
DUNN as a party defendant was not time-barred because of asserting
a new and different cause of action, the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in denying the motion to amend as being untimely.
The trial court had previously ordered that motions to amend pleadings "shall be heard by August 30, 1985.

After this date such

motions shall be heard only upon a showing of extremely exceptional circumstances."

(R.36).

The motion was not heard until

the commencement of trial on October 1, 1985 and at such hearing
no "extremely exceptional circumstances" were alleged or shown.
(R.164-168).
The court took the motion under advisement and the next
day denied it on the grounds that the cause of action alleged
in the Amended Complaint against DUNN was different than the cause
of action alleged against him by JEFFERSON in the Third-party
Complaint and that the motion was not timely presented and heard
as required by the scheduling order entered by the court on June
24, 1985.
Even in cases where the new cause of action would not be

-11-

time-barred against the party to be added, trial courts have been
held to have broad discretion in denying such motions.

In United

States v. Timmons, 672 F.2d 1373 (11th Cir. 1982), the government
brought an ejectment action against individuals claiming ownership
in a wildlife refuge and the defendants sought to join Mcintosh
County and various county officials.

The trial court denied the

motion and on appeal the Eleventh Circuit noted:
The district judge appropriately considered that joiner would not serve the interests of judicial economy in view of
the late stage of the proceedings and
the lack of any disadvantage to defendants
in bringing their claims in a separate
action. . . .
And, in Skehan v. Bd. of Trustees of Bloomsburg State College,
et al., 590 F.2d 470 (3rd Cir. 1978), where a college professor
brought an action against the college for damages arising from
his improper termination and shortly before trial sought to join
the trustees in their individual capacities, the Third Circuit
observed with respect to the timeliness issue:
. . . Moreover, Skehanfs motion was not
filed until a short time prior to the
scheduled date of trial on his remaining
substantive claims. In light of the district court's careful consideration of
these factors we cannot find the court's
denial of Skehan's motion for leave to
add the individual members of the Board
of Trustees as named defendants in his
complaint to have been contrary to the
sound exercise of its discretion.
In this case, while the substantive objection that to allow
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plaintiff to join DUNN in the proposed Third Claim of the Amended
Complaint would in effect negate the applicable statute of limitation is certainly the most supportable reason for denying plaintiff's motion, a trial court is certainly within its discretion
to deny the joiner of a party as a defendant on a new claim not
presented for argument until the morning of trial.

For this addi-

tional reason, the order of the trial court should be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing facts, points and authorities,
third-party defendant DUNN seeks affirmance of the judgment below
and his costs on appeal.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 29th day of January, 1987.

H. WAYNE WADSWORTH
of and for
WATKISS & CAMPBELL
310 South Main, 12th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah
84101
Attorneys for Respondent
Jon Dunn
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84111
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P. 0. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah
84145
Attorneys for Respondent Jefferson
Insurance Company of New York.
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